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Equity Funding: The Profession Reacts

Dr. Steven M. Flory, CPA, is Assistant
Professor of Accounting at the University of
Alabama in Birmingham. He is a graduate of
Louisiana State University and has worked for
an international public accounting firm. His
professional memberships include the AICPA,
AAA, NAA, and the Louisiana and Alabama
Societies of CPAs.
Dr. Kerry Cooper is Associate Professor of
Accounting at Texas A&M University in
College Station, Texas. He received B.S. and
M.S. degrees from Louisiana State University
and a Ph.D. from The University of Texas. Dr.
Cooper is co-author of a financial accounting
textbook and has published articles in numer
ous professional journals.
The authors reporton the resultsofa survey
they conducted to discover the profession's
reaction to the Equity Funding case.
Dr. Steven M. Flory, CPA
Birmingham, Alabama

More than three years have passed since
the American business community was
rocked by the revelations of massive,
management-perpetrated fraud in the
Equity Funding Corporation. As soon as
the dimensions of the fraud became
known, it was apparent that its repercus
sions would be widespread and dramatic,
especially for the accounting profession.
This article assesses the reaction of the
accounting profession to the fraud over
the past three years. An analysis of the
official AICPA response (the report of the
Special Committee on Equity Funding)
and the results of a survey of accounting
firms is included. Initially, however, it is
perhaps helpful to offer a brief description
of the fraud at Equity Funding.

The Equity Funding Case
The Equity Funding Corporation of
America was formed in the early 1960s. Its
operations focused on a marketing pro
gram involving life insurance policies and
mutual fund shares in a rather unique
investment package. This plan involved
the sale by Equity Funding of mutual fund
shares which were then pledged as collat
eral by the buyer for loans to buy term life
insurance. The major selling point was
that it permitted individuals to invest in
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mutual funds and receive life insurance as
an added benefit. The firm grew rapidly,
acquiring mutual funds, insurance com
panies, and a reputation for shrewd, ag
gressive management. From a price of $6 a
share in 1964, the company's stock soared
to a 1969 high of $80 a share.
The apparent profitability of the firm's
operations was, however, a sham almost
from the beginning. The installment na
ture of the mutual fund share sales caused
Equity Funding to be perennially starved
for cash. This pressing need for cash
obliged the company to heavily reinsure
new business — a practice which involves
the sale of a life insurance policy to
another company. Under a reinsuring ar
rangement, the issuing company con
tinues to service the policy and to collect
the customer's premium payment, of
which about 90% is remitted to the rein
surer.
The practice of reinsuring was not un
usual in the life insurance industry. Equity
Funding, however, gave a new twist to the
practice. It sold phony policies (which
were altered versions of real ones) in order
to obtain needed cash. On Equity's rec
ords, the sham policies were scattered
throughout its magnetic tape files but
were linked together by secret code num

bers. The latter feature permitted these
policies to be excluded from selected
printouts by the use of computer pro
grams designed specifically for this pur
pose — a useful measure for deceiving
auditors.
The sale of bogus life insurance policies
and the corresponding manipulation of
the books were the predominant features
of the fraud. Other fraudulent activities
were carried out, however, including the
borrowing of cash without recording the
liability, the booking of nonexistent secu
rities investments, and the inflation of the
existent asset values.
The fraud was exposed in early 1973 as
the result of telephone calls from a former
Equity Funding employee to the New
York State Department of Insurance and
to Raymond Dirks, a financial analyst in
New York. The Department of Insurance
referred the matter to the insurance regu
latory authorities in Illinois and California
where Equity Funding Life Insurance and
the parent company, respectively, were
chartered. The official investigation
launched by these agencies and the unof
ficial one launched by Dirks triggered
rumors that something was amiss with
Equity Funding. Trading volume in Equity
shares rose from a normal 14,000 shares a
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day to 768,000 shares on March 26, the last
day of trading before the SEC suspended
trading in all Equity Funding securities in
all markets. The price per share dropped
from 27¼ on March 15 to 14⅜ on March
26.
The SEC filed suit in federal district
court against Equity Funding, charging
fraud and violation of federal securities
laws. Under court order, the firm filed a
petition for protection under Chapter 10 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act, and a courtappointed trustee took control of Equity
Funding. The court also appointed
Touche Ross & Co. to perform a fraud
audit. Touche Ross issued an audit report
for Equity Funding in February 1974. The
report indicated that net assets were over
stated by $185 million, including more
than $62 million of bogus insurance
policies.

Report of the AICPA Special
Committee on Equity Funding
Other than company employees and
executives, there were primarily five
groups affected in varying degrees by the
Equity Funding fraud. These groups in
cluded the life insurance policyholders,
the insurance industry, financial analysts,
investors in Equity Funding, and inde
pendent certified public accountants. The
ultimate impact on the last group is
perhaps the most difficult to project.
The fact that Equity's auditors had failed
to discover the fraud became an im
mediate object of media attention and
raised questions regarding the effective

ness of current audit standards and pro
cedures and auditor responsibility for the
detection of management fraud. In May
1973 the AICPA appointed a special com
mittee to study whether or not the Equity
Funding case indicated a need for change
in auditing standards.
The special committee's report was re
leased to the public in June, 1975.1 The
committee concluded that the proper ap
plication of customary audit procedures
would probably have resulted in the de
tection of the existence of fraud at Equity
Funding. The committee recommended
only minor changes in auditing proce
dures (relating to confirmation of insur
ance policies and treatment of relatedparty transactions) and no changes in
auditing standards.
The committee carefully attempted to
draw these conclusions without attribut
ing fault to the Equity Funding auditors.
(This was not merely a matter of profes
sional courtesy. Although the criminal
cases involving Equity's auditors were
complete and the guilty verdicts rendered
at the time of the release of the committee
report, a great deal of civil litigation was
still pending.) The committee argued
against the enlargement of auditor re
sponsibility for fraud detection on the
grounds that the benefits were not com
mensurate with the costs.

Reaction to Equity Funding Case:
Survey Results
While the report on the Special Committee
on Equity Funding constitutes an official

response to this fraud case, it is also of
interest to assess the reactions of indi
vidual CPAs. In an attempt to gain some
insight regarding such reaction, a survey
of 500 public accounting firms and indi
vidual practitioners was conducted. The
mailing list for the questionnaire was ran
domly selected from Accounting Firms and
Practitioners which contains member firms
by state and city.2 The survey resulted in
105 usable responses. Represented among
the respondents were 77 local, 13 regional,
and 15 national and international firms.
The firms were queried in regard to only
one aspect of possible reaction to the
Equity Funding fraud. However, it is the
most crucial aspect — whether or not any
changes in the auditing approach em
ployed for computer-based accounting
systems had been implemented as a result
of the disclosures regarding Equity Fund
ing. Table 1 indicates the cumulative re
sponses of all the firms and of local,
regional, and national and international
firms, respectively.
Respondent reactions to the Equity
Funding case were analyzed according to
the size of geographical area served by
each firm. It is likely that these reactions
represent somewhat tentative attitudes
about a situation that most certainly will
be subjected to additional scrutiny and
action by certified public accounting firms.
However, from the analysis of these initial
responses, it appears that the national and
international firms took a more formal
approach while the local and regional
(Continued on pg. 18)

Table 1
REACTION TO THE EQUITY FUNDING CASE

Has your firm made any changes in its policy toward auditing financial statements produced in a computer-based accounting system as
a result of the alleged insurance fraud case involving the Equity Funding Corporation of America?
Local
Finns
(n=77)

Have not heard of case..............................................................

6%

Regional
Finns
(n=13)

8%

International
Firms
(n=15)
7%

All
Firms
(n=105)
7%

No, we are awaiting final outcome of pending litigation
before further action is taken........................................

21

30

27

23

Yes, to the extent of informal suggestions and
comments exchanged by firm personnel...................

42

54

27

42

Yes, a committee has been established to study the
audit implications but no recommendations
have been made ................................................................

1

0

20

4

Yes, formal changes have been made and implemented

3

0

7

3

Do not know firm reaction......................................................

9

8

6

8

No response.................................................................................

18

0

6

13

100%

100%

100%

100%
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the user, is the technique of data encryp
tion. Cryptography represents a trans
formation of data which makes it unread
able to a person who does not have access
to the cryptographic key. This technique
deals with the problem of limiting access
by unauthorized users. It also deals with
the problem of electromagnetic eaves
dropping.
Additional provisions for data security
represent potentially a significant increase
in the cost of information systems. One
estimate suggested that the additional
data which would have to be collected to
provide a complete history of all accesses
to data files and additions for unambigu
ous identification of individuals would
increase the size of existing files by 10% a
year. The increase in file sizes for these
identification records and the additional
checking procedures implemented in
software and hardware features represent
a price which will have to be paid in
increased processing time for each file
access. The costs of increasing individual
privacy should be considered as carefully
as the conditions to be imposed in insur
ing that privacy.

Social Security Numbers
as Universal Identifiers
Adoption of a single standard identifica
tion system for all individuals would make
data-gathering, data storage, and data
retrieval more efficient. It would also
facilitate the exchange of information be
tween computer systems and data files.
For that reason there have been several
proposals to establish standard universal
identifying numbering system. Further,
the suggestion has frequently been made
that this universal identification number
ing system should be the social security
numbers.
One objection to the adoption of such a
universal identifier rests with the concept
of a common identification scheme. Many
object to the potential for abuse and exces
sive control which such a standard iden
tification number could have. Apart from
such a consideration, however, use of the
social security number itself has several
weaknesses as a universal identifier
should that concept find acceptance.
Social security numbers as they cur
rently exist incorporate no self-checking
features which would make it possible to
distinguish any randomly chosen nine
digit number from a valid social security
number. Further as early as 1973, the
Social Security Administration estimated
that more than4.2 million people had two
or more social security numbers.
The Privacy Act of 1974, in section 7,
provides:
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(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Fed
eral, State, or local government agency
to deny to any individual any right,
benefit, or privilege provided by law
because of such individual's refusal to
disclose his social security account
number.

(2) the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this subsection shall not apply with
respect to —
(A) any disclosure which is required
by Federal statute, or
(B) the disclosure of a social security
number to any Federal, state, or
local agency maintaining a system of
records in existence and operating
before January 1, 1975, if such dis
closure was required under statute
or regulation adopted prior to such
date to verify the identity of an
individual.
(b) Any Federal, state, or local govern
ment agency which requests an indi
vidual to disclose his social security
account number shall inform that indi
vidual whether that disclosure is man
datory or voluntary, by what statutory
or other authority such number is so
licited, and what uses will be made of
it.

Implications for the Future
With the continued expansion of com
puterized information systems, the con
cern with individual privacy and the re
lated requirements for data accuracy, con
fidentiality, and security are likely to in
crease. The Privacy Act of 1974 will not be
the final legislation in that area.
Additional federal action (HR 1984) deal
ing with privacy and data security con
cerns within individual states and in the
private sector is already under considera
tion.
Soon the privacy regulations will extend
to the many thousands of installations
operated by business and other sectors of
society besides Federal agencies. In addi
tion, many states are also actively study
ing legislation dealing with protection of
individual privacy implications in com
puter data banks.
This heightened concern at both the
Federal and state level gives promise that
adequate attention will be focused on the
potential abuses of such data systems. At
the same time, it is essential that we
manage to develop some consensus be
tween the federal and state agencies and
the private sector services on the appro
priate levels of regulation and the
standard security procedures to be im
plemented. Without this consensus we
could be faced with the development of

numerous and conflicting regulations by
the many legal jurisdictions currently in
volved. Such duplication and conflict
would severely limit the usefulness of
these data systems and dramatically raise
their cost.
Equity Funding
(Continued from pg. 12)
firms reacted to the case in a more informal
manner. About half of the local and re
gional firms stated that their firm's reac
tions to Equity Funding disclosures were
limited to informal comments among firm
personnel. About one-fourth of the na
tional and international firms, on the other
hand, had a much larger frequency of
instances in which they established a
committee of firm personnel in order to
study the audit implications of the Equity
Funding fraud. One-fifth of the national
and international firms, compared to al
most none of the local or regional firms,
stated that they had formed such commit
tees.
Few of the respondents indicated any
formal changes in audit policies and pro
cedures for computer-based accounting
systems as a result of the Equity Funding
case disclosures, regardless of the size of
the firm surveyed. Only three percent of
the local firms and seven percent of the
national and international firms indicated
any formal changes.

Summary and Conclusions
The Equity Funding fraud raised serious
questions about the role of the auditor in
the American business system. The attest
function is intended to provide assurance
to investors that financial information
concerning firms offering investment se
curities is a fair representation (in accor
dance with generally accepted accounting
principles) of economic realities. Such
massive fraud cases clearly place this pre
sumed assurance in jeopardy.
The accounting profession, up to this
point in time at least, has reacted cau
tiously and deliberately, but positively, to
the Equity scandal. Only time will tell if
the profession's reaction has been an ap
propriate response.

Notes
1Special Committee on Equity Funding, Re
port of the Committee, The Adequacy of Auditing
Standards of Procedures Currently Applied in the
Examination of Financial Statements (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants, 1975).
2American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants, Accounting Firms and Practitioners:
1971 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1972). This survey was
conducted in November, 1973, approximately
eight months after the Equity Funding fraud
was disclosed to the public.

